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ABSTRACT 
 
We advance scholarship about how macroeconomic forces differentially manifest 
themselves across local spaces by developing a holistic conceptual framework and 
empirical analyses involving multilevel change modeling.  Unlike prior work, we examine 
differential rates of change in neighborhood indicators.  We illustrate our approach with 
Chicago data measuring the crime, housing, and economic domains of neighborhood 
quality-of-life over the 2000-2009 period.  We find that the local dynamic manifestations 
of macroeconomic cycles were far more nuanced than have been previously observed.  
Neighborhood indicators moved along distinct trajectories, sometimes but not 
necessarily tracking each other or the overall business cycle, and they changed with 
varied intensities.  The Great Recession of 2006-2009 had disparate negative impacts 
on lower-income and minority-occupied neighborhoods’ local job opportunities, home 
prices, and home foreclosures, though this was not true for credit or crime indicators. 
Credit indicators performed geographically much differently than in the prior Chicago 
recession. 
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The Disparate Neighborhood Impacts of the Great Recession: 
Evidence from Chicago 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
Documenting and explaining multidimensional changes in urban neighborhoods 
has been of longstanding interest to urban geographers on both substantive and 
methodological grounds.  Substantively, there is longstanding evidence that the 
neighborhood constitutes a crucial component of residential satisfaction (Birch et al., 
1979; Galster and Hesser 1981) and determinant of housing values.  Thus, any forces 
that lead to changes in the quality of life experienced in the neighborhood and/or 
demand by the market as a whole for properties in the neighborhood will be of 
paramount importance to residents and property owners alike (Grigsby et al., 1987).  
Lately this importance has typically been expressed in worried overtones, as the so-
called “Great Recession” has left many neighborhoods reeling from well-publicized 
spikes in unemployment, crime, and foreclosed homes.  
 There have been previous claims that economic forces operating at large 
geographic scales have differential impacts across smaller-scale spaces and, in 
particular, these impacts are disproportionately more negative for communities 
dominated by low-income and/or minority populations; e.g. Squires (1982); Kasarda 
(1985); Wilson (1987).  As such, one can think of these geographic effects in terms 
analogous to the legal concept of “disparate impact:” a superficially neutral, non-
discriminatory policy, practice (or in this case, macroeconomic event) has statistically 
disproportionate negative consequences for a vulnerable or legally protected class of 
individuals.   
  2 
 There are two, not mutually exclusive pathways through which disparate small-
scale spatial impacts of large-scale economic forces might transpire: contextual and 
compositional differences across space.  The local context might differ in terms of its 
institutions, infrastructure, access, or behavioral tipping points for households and 
investors in ways that render them more sensitive to altered macro-forces.  From this 
perspective, these contextual features would penalize any type of household who might 
be unfortunate enough to reside there.  On the other hand, there may be certain groups 
who, due to aggregate characteristics of their individual members, will be rendered more 
vulnerable to the altered macro-forces.  From this perspective, these neighborhood 
compositional features would penalize places with concentrations of this type of 
vulnerable household. 
Regardless of the underlying causal pathways. the quantitative examination of 
neighborhood dynamics in response to macroeconomic shocks is a complex endeavor 
on methodological grounds.  While increased availability of small-area data and 
technological advances in GIS have enabled development of rich panel databases of 
neighborhood indicators, researchers and practitioners have reported on the “levels” of 
these indicators, and how these levels have changed over time (Sawicki and Flynn, 
1996).  While this approach is instructive to those focused on the intensity of a particular 
aspect of neighborhood quality or those whose goal is to identify “problem” conditions for 
a particular neighborhood, it is limited if one is more interested in elucidating the 
temporal dynamics of neighborhoods.  Gaining a deeper understanding calls for analytic 
methods that are better suited for exploring this realm.  In this paper we introduce one 
such method—multilevel change modeling—and demonstrate its power in a particular 
geographic application: City of Chicago neighborhoods during the business cycle of the 
last decade. 
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Specifically, our empirical analysis focuses on examining neighborhood indicator 
trajectories, defined as the rate of change, as distinct from the more typical focus on 
indicator trends, defined as the amount of change.  The shift in focus to trajectories from 
trends is necessary for an investigation of dynamics, as it allows identification of 
differences and similarities in how neighborhoods are changing that may be obscured 
due to differences in levels.  That is, two neighborhoods may be changing at similar 
rates (i.e., share common trajectories) but the similarities may not be apparent from a 
conventional trend analysis due to the differences in initial level of the condition between 
the two neighborhoods (e.g., one neighborhood started at a very high level while the 
second started at a very low level).   
In this paper we demonstrate the value of multilevel change modeling in an 
illustrative neighborhood trajectories analysis of how Chicago quality-of-life dynamics 
manifested themselves geographically over the course of the last decade’s business 
cycle and how they varied among neighborhoods classified into different types.  The 
natural experiment that this severe “boom and bust” macroeconomic cycle from 2000-
2009 represents allows us to investigate three research questions.  First, over the last 
decade, how do the trajectories of Chicago neighborhood indicators representing crime, 
housing, and economic domains of quality-of-life vary across phases of the business 
cycle?  Second, do these trajectories of neighborhood indicators vary significantly across 
five different types of Chicago neighborhoods distinguished by socioeconomic, 
racial/ethnic, and housing stock characteristics?  Third, if so, do trajectory differences 
suggest that lower-income and predominantly minority-occupied neighborhoods were 
hurt more by the Great Recession? 
In brief, we find that neighborhood indicators moved along distinct trajectories, 
sometimes but not necessarily tracking each other or the overall business cycle, and 
they changed with varied intensities.  The intensity of these temporal changes distinctly 
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varied across five types of Chicago neighborhoods distinguished by their economic and 
racial-ethnic composition and characteristics of their housing stock.  We find  evidence 
that the Great Recession of 2006-2009 had disparate negative impacts on lower-income 
and predominantly minority-occupied neighborhoods’ local job opportunities, home 
prices, and home foreclosures, though this was not true for credit and crime indicators.   
We hope that this paper contributes to the scholarly literature in conceptual, 
methodological, and substantive ways.  Conceptually, we develop the first holistic model 
in which the disparate impacts of recessions on lower-income, minority neighborhoods 
can be understood and potential causal pathways elucidated comprehensively.  
Methodologically, we are the first to apply multilevel change modeling techniques to an 
analysis of neighborhood dynamics.  Substantively, our nuanced evidence about how 
the Great Recession affected Chicago neighborhoods substantially augments the scant 
empirical evidence in this realm.  
Our paper is organized as follows.  We begin by advancing our holistic 
conceptual framework for how the recent economic downturn affects urban 
neighborhoods and why these effects are likely to be geographically differentiated 
across neighborhoods.  Second, we review the scant prior empirical scholarship related 
to macroeconomic forces’ disparate impacts on urban neighborhoods.  Third, we 
introduce our empirical work by describing the sources and nature of our longitudinal 
data for the city of Chicago, how we defined, standardized and adjusted neighborhood 
indicators, and the cluster analysis we employed to ascertain five distinct neighborhood 
groups in Chicago.  Fourth, we explain our trajectory-based approach for understanding 
neighborhood dynamics: multilevel change modeling.  Fifth, we examine our quality-of-
life indicator trajectories during the last decade, comparing their volatility and tracking of 
the business cycle.  Sixth, we examine differences among indicator trajectories across 
neighborhood groups to see the potential disparate impact of the “Great Recession” — 
  5 
the economic downturn which started with the collapse of the housing market in 2006.  
We discuss key findings and offer conclusions in the final sections. 
 
THE URBAN GEOGRAPHY OF DISPARATE IMPACTS:  
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 Our conceptual framework is portrayed diagrammatically in Figure 1.  We focus 
on two elements of the Great Recession—housing and economic—both of which have 
two key constituents.  The housing component was characterized by: (1) an 
unsustainable home price inflation bubble, followed by a price collapse in virtually all 
U.S. metropolitan areas; and (2) easy mortgage credit provided in a “permissively 
underwritten” (if not downright predatory) fashion, followed by difficult-to-obtain mortgage 
credit for all but the most flush, credit-worthy loan applicants.  The economic component 
was characterized by: (1) weakened demand for labor, which lowered the incomes of 
millions of households through unemployment, underemployment, and lower wages; and 
(2) fiscal strains on local (municipal, country) budgets, typically resulting in layoffs and 
wage reductions for public service employees and slashes in public services.  We 
recognize that the housing and economic components of the recent business cycle (as 
well as their constituent parts) are intrinsically interrelated; we separate them here only 
for clarity and suggest their interconnections with double-headed arrows in Figure 1. 
 In concert, these housing and economic forces massively boosted the number of 
home foreclosures.  Many homeowners found that their falling household incomes could 
no longer support their mortgage payments and/or local taxes, especially if these 
mortgage payments were proffered initially on subprime or predatory terms.  Others 
found that collapsing prices rendered them “under water” with outstanding mortgage 
balances exceeding the current value of the home, and exercised their “rational default” 
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option.  The net effect of these foreclosures was to decrease the number of owner-
occupiers within the existing housing stock, with concomitant increases in the number of 
vacant properties (real-estate/lender-owned, government-owned, and private speculator-
owned) and absentee-owned, renter-occupied properties (see Figure 1). 
 [Figure 1 about here] 
 The rise in vacant, foreclosed properties and the associated fall in 
homeownership rates in a neighborhood yield many negative impacts for 
neighborhoods.  We can expect aggregate quality of homes to fall as: (1) their owner-
occupants’ incomes fall and (2) absentee owners maintain properties at lower standards 
than owner-occupants, all else equal (Galster, 1987).  In some weak-market cases, 
vacant properties may be stripped of their resalable components, yielding a structure so 
badly damaged that there is no financially feasible recourse but to abandon it (Galster, 
Cutsinger and Malega, 2008).  More foreclosed properties, in turn, will likely increase the 
number of crimes nearby (Ellen, Lacoe, and Sharygin 2011; Immergluck and Smith 
2006b; Harding, Rosenblatt and Yao 2009; Cui 2010; Goodstein and Lee 2010; Katz, 
Wallace and Hedburg 2011).  Falling disposable incomes of individual households 
coupled with falling population densities may lead to the closing and/or moving 
“downmarket” of the local retail sector serving the effected neighborhood.  These 
collective changes to the neighborhood will lower the quality of its residential and 
economic life in aggregate; see Figure 1. 
 The causal process does not stop here, but feeds back in several ways. The 
reduced quality of life in the effected neighborhood may alter the structure of demand for 
it if its relative place in the metro-wide hierarchy of neighborhood shifts.  As housing 
sales prices and rents drop relatively to reflect the fallen quality of life, altered in- and 
out-mobility processes likely transpire.  Current households who feasibly can move to 
superior neighborhoods may choose to do so.  Households with incomes lower than the 
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prior residents’ may find it feasible to move in.  At the same time, households that 
previously would have chosen this neighborhood as “the best they could afford” may 
look elsewhere.  These mobility processes on net yield a process of downward income 
succession (Grigsby et al., 1987), which reinforces the initial decline in the 
neighborhood’s income profile produced by the recession.  The decline in multiple 
dimensions of the neighborhood’s quality of life, in conjunction with downward income 
succession, further depresses property values in the area, eroding equity of home 
owners still further.  The lower income profile of residents and lower aggregate assessed 
values of residential and non-residential properties (through reductions both in the 
number of properties and in the values of extant ones) erodes the tax base of the local 
political jurisdiction, forcing it into still more challenging fiscal plights. 
 The model in Figure 1 provides several points of entry providing a rationale for 
why recessions may have disproportionate impacts on lower-income, minority 
communities.  We believe that the result is produced by a combination of (1) 
composition: the magnitudes of the housing and economic impacts are greater on the 
residents here; and (2) context: the aggregate responses to a given magnitude of impact 
on the residents are greater here.  In other words, part of the explanation is tautological: 
those neighborhoods will be hit hardest where their residents have been hit hardest.  But 
part of the explanation is behavioral: some neighborhoods are more vulnerable to 
decline for any given hardship inflicted upon its residents. 
As for the former, there is strong evidence that the intensity of subprime and 
predatory lending—and, as a result, foreclosures—was greater in low-income and 
minority communities (Goldstein, 2007; Squires, 2011).  Moreover, Hoynes, Miller and 
Schaller (2012) found that, as in previous downturns, the latest recession hit black and 
Hispanic workers and those with the least education hardest.  Given patterns of 
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segregation by ethnicity, race and occupation, these facts would predict disparate 
geographic impacts on the basis of compositional effects alone. 
As for the latter, contextual effects, low-income and minority communities are 
more likely to be vulnerable to threshold points that, when passed, trigger substantial 
degrees of decline.  In these neighborhoods rental property markets may even in the 
best of times be barely lucrative enough for owners to stay in business; any downturn in 
revenues can lead to abandonment (Galster, Cutsinger and Malega, 2008).  An 
analogous argument can be made for marginally profitable local retailers: any further 
declines in the trade are population and/or their disposable income may trigger business 
failure or relocation.  Moreover, these neighborhoods may have originally had relatively 
small shares of homeowners and residents in professional-managerial occupations; any 
further declines may trigger catastrophic falls in collective efficacy and local institutional 
supports (Galster, Quercia and Cortes, 2000).  Spatial concentration of foreclosures may 
also reach a threshold point where any additional foreclosures yield substantially greater 
upsurges in crime (Ellen, Lacoe, and Sharygin 2011).  Thus, in low-income, minority 
neighborhoods in inferior positions in the metropolitan hierarchy there may be multiple 
dimensions of their residential and economic quality of life that decline disproportionately 
as a consequence of a macroeconomic shock. 
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THE URBAN GEOGRAPHY OF DISPARATE IMPACTS:  
PRIOR SCHOLARSHIP 
 
The first empirical works to probe this disparate spatial impact proposition 
rigorously were the related studies by Galster and Mincy (1993) and Galster, Mincy and 
Tobin (1997), which examined decadal changes in census tract poverty rates between 
1980 and 1990 across all U.S. metropolitan areas.  They stratified tracts by dominant 
racial group to assess how a variety of metro-wide economic forces may have affected 
the strata differentially.  They found that although most poverty growth in predominantly 
black-occupied tracts occurred in metropolitan areas with greater shares of employment 
in manufacturing, whatever losses of manufacturing jobs that were evinced in a given 
metropolitan area penalized such neighborhoods disproportionately.  They probed this 
evidence of disparate racial impact further and found that it was associated with black 
neighborhoods’ propensity for location in counties with larger shares of employment in 
manufacturing and in central cities (i.e., contextual effects), and not characteristics of 
black populations (i.e., compositional effects).  Unfortunately, these studies were limited 
by the unavailability of inter-census data, and thus were only able to explore 
neighborhood impacts of longer-term trends, not shorter-term business cycles. 
Hackworth (2001) was the first study to employ annual observations of 
neighborhood indicators to examine the impact of the early 1990s recession.  He 
focused on New York City’s gentrification processes and broader patterns of property 
investment.  He performed no statistical analyses, instead plotting time series graphs 
and maps of a variety of housing market indicators and drawing conclusions by 
inspection.  He found substantial spatial variability in responses to the recession.  
Specifically, housing demolitions in northeastern Brooklyn, northern Manhattan, and 
portions of southern Bronx evinced sizable increases during the recession that were 
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quickly reversed as business conditions improved.  By contrast, demolitions decreased 
in much of central Queens as the recession took hold.  However, other indicators of 
housing market activity showed little sensitivity to the business cycle (e.g., vacancy 
rates) whereas others (e.g., tax delinquencies) were pro-cyclical yet were not 
differentiated spatially.  Overall, Hackworth concluded that inner-core housing markets 
were more sensitive to downturns in the local economy.  Though he did not correlate 
changes in neighborhood indicators to socioeconomic or racial characteristics of 
neighborhoods, examination of his maps suggests that the recession had disparate 
negative spatial impacts on lower-income, predominantly minority-occupied 
neighborhoods, and those that were in the process of gentrification.   
Ong et al. (2003) examined annual measures of retail jobs, home values, income 
and school free lunch program participation across 53 community planning areas Los 
Angeles County during the business cycle of the 1990s.  The cyclical volatility of home 
values proved the greatest; that of retail sales proved the smallest.  Like Hackworth 
(2001), they plotted trends and mapped these values but extended the literature by 
regressing observed changes in the levels of their indicators on neighborhood poverty 
rates and measures of racial/ethnic composition.  They also found substantial spatial 
variations in how indicators responded to the recession, with the sensitivity of lower-
income neighborhoods appearing over twice as large, though the pattern of response 
according to racial/ethnic differences was less clear-cut.  The first three indicators above 
changed over time in line with the business cycle, but the last (not surprisingly) proved 
counter-cyclical because its benefits were means-tested.  They concluded that the 
business cycle had disparate impacts on poorer Los Angeles neighborhoods’ 
employment, income and home values.  
 Thus, the scanty existing literature investigating the short-term spatial effects of 
recessions indicates that the negative effects of a downturn are more pronounced in 
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economically disadvantaged and minority-occupied neighborhoods, at least for most of 
the limited number of neighborhood indicators investigated.  This conclusion should be 
treated cautiously, however, because of serious methodological and substantive 
limitations.  First, it is based on evidence from the 1990s business cycle in two 
idiosyncratic cities.  Second, few neighborhood indicators have been utilized.  Third, and 
perhaps most critically, the empirical methods employed to assess disparate impact may 
have produced misleading results.  Inasmuch as poorer and predominantly minority-
occupied neighborhoods typically represent extreme values of levels of neighborhood 
indicators, regression to the mean may produce greater observed amount of change in 
these indicators over time that have little to do with disparate impact of business cycles.  
We argue that disparate impact is more appropriately measured by examination of 
neighborhood trajectories (i.e., rates of change) 
Our empirical research aims to contribute to strengthening and expanding the 
literature in four ways.  First, we explore the most recent business cycle’s effects on 
Chicago, a city with a distinct economic base from New York or Los Angeles (Doussard, 
Peck, and Theodore, 2009).  Second, we employ a wide range of neighborhood 
indicators, including several never-before utilized in the exploration of disparate spatial 
impacts: crime, home foreclosures, and mortgage and retail lending.  Third, instead of ad 
hoc geographic categorizations, we conduct a cluster analysis to identify a priori groups 
of neighborhoods differing in socioeconomic status, race/ethnicity and housing stock 
characteristics.  Fourth, we estimate for the first time in this literature multilevel change 
models to analyze trajectories of our neighborhood indicators for each of our 
neighborhood groups.  This method allows for both a more precise estimation of overall 
effects on a group of neighborhoods and assessment of variation among the 
neighborhoods within a group.  
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DATA AND MEASURES 
 
Geographic Unit of Analysis 
 
In 2003, the MacArthur Foundation of Chicago funded an ambitious initiative to 
improve conditions in distressed urban neighborhoods: the New Community Program 
(NCP).  A 10-year, $47 million effort, NCP is a comprehensive effort to engage 
community-based groups to attack multiple problems simultaneously — in education, 
workforce development, housing, social services, and public policy.  Managed by the 
Local Initiatives Support Corporation of Chicago (LISC/Chicago), NCP focuses its efforts 
on 14 neighborhood areas in Chicago with varying challenges.  Inasmuch as the 
research reported here was completed as part of a larger evaluation of NCP, we 
collected data corresponding to the geographies of the 14 NCP neighborhoods, plus the 
remaining 66 Community Areas specified by the City of Chicago.  We emphasize that 
although these geographic units are relatively large (typically several census tracts), they 
have longstanding social meaning in Chicago; see Figure 2 for a map of these areas. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
In this study we use data provided by the Metro Chicago Information Center.  
MCIC obtained data from a variety of secondary sources, transformed them to create 
counts and sums for the Census tracts within Chicago, aggregated them to create 
measures at we hereafter call the “neighborhood” level, and then standardized them to 
adjust for different neighborhood population sizes.1  These data sources and resultant 
indicators are described below. 
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Crime Data and Indicators 
 
Data originate from crimes reported by the Chicago Police Department for the 
period 1991 to 2009, classified using the Uniform Crime Report (UCR) typology.  Each 
record reflects a police report of an incident, which may include multiple crimes.2  
Reports were geo-coded, aggregated to the neighborhood level then standardized 
across neighborhoods by dividing by population in 10,000s.  Crime rates were divided 
into two types: property (arson, auto theft, burglary, and larceny-theft) and violent 
(assault, murder, rape, and robbery).  
We recognize that these data have shortcomings.  As they originate from police 
reports, unreported crimes are not included; the underreporting rate is likely neither 
random nor constant across neighborhoods, though the evidence is mixed (Baumer, 
2002; Goudriaan, Wittebrood and Nieubeerta, 2006).  Moreover, the accuracy with which 
the Chicago Police Department publishes crime statistics may also vary over the course 
of the business cycle and associated city fiscal strains.  Nevertheless, these are the 
sorts of crime data that have been employed in prior scholarship and are likely the only 
ones available publicly.  
 
Housing and Mortgage Market Data and Indicators 
 
There is a long research tradition in real estate economics which uses home 
values (usually measured as sales prices) as a primary indicator of neighborhood 
quality.  Specifically, price differentials which remain after accounting for the home’s 
structural features represent capitalization of the entire package of location-specific 
amenities.  A related strategy, commonly used when information regarding individual 
home characteristics and sales data are unavailable or too cumbersome, regards home 
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sales as an indicator of capital flows into a neighborhood.  With this approach, both the 
volume of sales and the average purchase price are informative indicators for relative 
comparisons between neighborhoods.  The sum of the purchase prices can be thought 
of as the total capital flow from in-moving, home-buying residents; increases in this flow 
represent a higher valuation and/or desirability for the neighborhood.  Additionally, 
increasing average prices signal growing capital gains by homeowners, a potentially 
important source of family wealth. 
 Here we measure this dimension via indicators constructed from administrative 
data collected under the auspices of the federal Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 
(HMDA), which includes information on the location and buyer characteristics of home 
purchase loan applications and originations reported by certain lending institutions.3  
Using these data, we constructed an indicator reflecting overall market activity: total 
dollar value of originated home purchase loans per single-family, owner-occupied 
housing unit.  From these data we also specified the mean home loan dollar amount, 
which provides information comparable to the average sales price or home value 
described above (Galster, Hayes and Johnson, 2005).  Note that the base loan data for 
both indicators apply to single-family and small multi-unit dwellings (i.e., dwelling units 
containing 1 to 4 units) for the time period 1992-2009. 
Counts of completed foreclosures on single-family homes for the years 1998 to 
2009 originated from administrative records kept by the Cook County Circuit Clerk’s 
Office.  Foreclosure completions count of the number of forecloses whose resolution 
was an auction of the property in question (foreclosure filings that are resolved in other 
ways are not classified as completed).4  We aggregated counts to the neighborhood 
level, summed for the calendar year, and standardized by the number of single-family, 
owner-occupied dwellings, in 10,000s.  Unfortunately, completed foreclosure indicators 
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do not give a precise estimate of when a foreclosed property becomes vacant and then 
(possibly) is occupied again.         
 
  16 
Economic Activity Data and Indicators 
 
Commercial development activity is difficult to track.  One source that is 
increasingly used is administrative data on business lending reported by certain lending 
institutions under the auspices of the federal Community Reinvestment Act.  These data 
contain information about small business loans — that is, business loans of $1 million or 
less (not necessarily the same as loans made to small businesses), including the 
amount of the loan and a few characteristics of the loan recipient and can be used to 
gauge, to some limited degree, the flows of commercial capital into the neighborhood.  
We employed two indicators constructed from these data: the number of loans and the 
total dollar value of loans; the neighborhoods’ commercial land area is used as the 
standardization factor.  Commercial land area was obtained from an aerial survey 
commissioned by the Chicago Metropolitan Agency on Planning in 2000.  The annual 
time series is available from 1996 to 2009. 
Indicators of employment and jobs are rarely included in neighborhood analysis 
of quality-of-life due to a lack of data; until recently, this type of data was even rarer than 
data pertaining to commercial development.  However, the Census Bureau Local 
Employment Dynamics (LED) program has developed and released a data product, 
“OnTheMap” which includes employment and jobs counts for very low levels of 
geography.  From these data we constructed an indicator: the number of employed 
residents per 10,000 working-age population.  The time series is available from 2002 to 
2009. 
 Descriptive statistics (based on the 2002-2009 period of common data 
availability) of the neighborhood indicators we employ in our analysis below are 
presented in Table 1. 
 [Table 1 about here] 
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Neighborhood Groups 
 
 In our analyses we examine potential differences in quality-of-life indicator 
dynamics across different neighborhood contexts.  To accomplish this categorization we 
undertook a cluster analysis of the 80 aforementioned Chicago neighborhoods, based 
on a large number of indicators conceptually related to the “market strength” of the area.  
These indicators measured both 2000 levels of and pre-2000 changes in indicators of: 
median income, racial ethnic composition, mortgage market activity and housing stock 
characteristics.  A listing of all variables used in the clustering and their mean values is 
presented in Appendix Table 1.  We applied several clustering algorithms and found that 
they all led us to specify a five-fold typology5: 
  18 
 
Chicago Neighborhood Groups 
 
Group I Moderate income, predominately black residents; housing is mostly 
owner-occupied, single-family units 
 
Group II Moderate income, predominately white residents – about one quarter of 
whom are foreign-born; with a mix of single-family and multi-unit owner-
occupied dwellings 
 
Group III Moderate income, predominantly Hispanic residents – almost 40% are 
foreign-born; housing is mostly smaller multi-unit dwellings, split between 
owner-occupiers and renters 
 
Group IV Low income; variety of racial and ethnic predominance; housing is mostly 
renter-occupied, large multi-unit dwellings 
 
Group V High income; variety of racial and ethnic predominance; housing is mostly 
large multi-unit dwellings, with more renters than owners 
 
The neighborhood groups are primarily distinguished by the income level and 
predominant race/ethnicity of the neighborhood residents.  Details about differences in 
all clustering variables are provided in Appendix Table 1.  For example, Chicago 
neighborhoods where the average (mean) household income is around the city average 
(i.e., middle and working class neighborhoods) are split by race/ethnicity between three 
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groups.  Neighborhoods with predominantly black residents are in Group I, those with 
predominantly white residents are in Group II, and neighborhoods where a large 
proportion of the residents are Hispanic are in Group III.  The other two groups contain 
the neighborhoods where the average incomes are below (Group IV) and above (Group 
V) the city average.  The neighborhoods in Groups IV and V constitute a more diverse 
set of neighborhood racial/ethnic types (some with one group predominating, others 
more mixed) compared to the first three groups. 
The neighborhoods in the five groups also differ in terms of their housing 
configuration.  Two of the moderate income groups — neighborhoods with 
predominantly black residents (Group I) and those with predominantly white residents 
(Group II) — consist of mostly owner-occupied housing.  Most of the residences in the 
Group I neighborhoods are single family dwelling units, while those in Group II are a mix 
of single-family and large (five or more) multi-unit buildings.  The other moderate income 
group, neighborhoods with a considerable proportion of Hispanic residents (Group III), is 
split between rental and owner-occupied housing, the majority of which are small (two to 
four) multi-unit buildings.  Finally, the low income (Group IV) and high income (Group V) 
neighborhood groups have similar housing configurations — large, multi-unit buildings 
where the majority of residents are renters. 
Each group of neighborhoods is somewhat spatially contiguous; see the map in 
Figure 2.  The high income neighborhoods (Group V) are clustered around the central 
business district of the city (known as the Loop) — this neighborhood group includes all 
of Central Chicago as well as North Side and West Side neighborhoods that border 
Chicago’s downtown.  The low income neighborhoods (Group IV) are mostly in 
Chicago’s South Side, although a few are in the West Side.  The spatial distribution of 
the moderate income neighborhood groups reflects the historical population distribution 
of Chicago, with the neighborhoods having a predominately white population (Group II) 
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in the North Side, those with predominately black populations (Group I) in the South 
Side, and those with a relatively high concentration of Hispanics (Group III) in the West 
Side.  
 
ANALYSIS METHOD: MULTILEVEL CHANGE MODELING 
 
We specify a multilevel change model to analyze trajectories of our neighborhood 
indicators.  This model decomposes the longitudinal trend by specifying it as a function 
of time with two parameters: a starting level (intercept) and a rate of change (slope, the 
trajectory upon which we focus).  In addition, this method allows for estimation of 
trajectories for the city overall and groups of neighborhoods, and an assessment of their 
variation among individual neighborhoods.  This method provides a more precise 
estimation of overall and group trajectories because the inter-neighborhood variation is 
explicitly included in the model (i.e., each neighborhood has its own trajectory) and 
variation in levels is modeled separately from variation in amount/direction of change 
(i.e., each neighborhood has separate slope and intercept parameters).6  
Multilevel models, also known as hierarchical linear models (HLM), are generally 
referred to as change models when applied to longitudinal data such as ours.  The basic 
characteristic of these models is the inclusion of random neighborhood effects, to 
account for the influence of neighborhoods on their repeated observations.7  These 
random neighborhood effects indicate the degree of variability in the change model main 
effects that exists within the population of neighborhoods.  They also help remove 
potential bias due to selection on geographic unobservables that otherwise might distort 
our conclusions about disparate impact. 
Suppose the outcome of interest (y) is hypothesized to have a linear, additive 
change process, which could be represented as: 
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where yit is the level for neighborhood i at time t, xit is the measure of time for 
neighborhood i at time t,  αit and βit are the intercept and slope parameters for 
neighborhood i (i.e., the starting level and amount of change per unit change in xit), and 
εit is the residual (error) for neighborhood i.  The intercept and slope are random 
variables (i.e., the random effects), with their variation across neighborhoods modeled 
as: 
 
and 
 
where α and β represent the fixed effects for the intercept and slope (somewhat 
analogous to the mean of the random effects) and µαi and µβi represent the random 
variation of neighborhoods.  Substituting the fixed effects equations into the first yields 
the combined model: 
 
To fit this model, two fixed effects (α and β) and four variance/covariance parameters 
are estimated:  the residual variance (var(εit)), the slope and intercept variance (var(µαi) 
and var(µβi)), and the covariance between the slope and intercept (cov(µαi, µβi)).   
For each of our quality-of-life indicators we estimate separate multilevel change 
models for three time periods (2000-2002, 2003-2005, 2006-2009) which roughly 
correspond to the phases of the economic cycle over the past decade; the first and third 
period correspond to a recessionary economy in Chicago, while the second period was 
an expansionary economy.  Since the time periods are fairly short the models are 
simple, consisting of two parameters:  the initial, or starting, level (intercept) and the rate 
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of change (slope).  The latter parameters are of most interest here, as they indicate both 
the intensity and direction of the trajectories.   
In the results that follow, we first will examine the slope parameters (measures of 
trajectory), comparing intensity and direction in each of the three time periods.  This will 
permit the assessment of the relative volatility of the indicators and their responses to 
cyclical economic changes.  This examination essentially establishes a descriptive 
portrait of Chicago neighborhoods during the tumultuous 2000s. Next, we will examine 
inter-neighborhood group variation in the slope parameters across the three time 
periods, exploring the extent to which trajectory variation is associated with 
neighborhood context (i.e., group) and, if so, whether the Great Recession had more 
harmful impacts on neighborhood groups with greater concentrations of minority and 
low-income households. 
 
RESULTS: A PORTRAIT OF THE 2000S BUSINESS CYCLE SEEN THROUGH 
CHICAGO NEIGHBORHOOD INDICATOR TRAJECTORIES 
 
Now that we have defined our neighborhood indicators, neighborhood groups, and 
analytical method, we begin reporting our results by describing how the business cycle 
of the last decade manifested itself across the terrain of Chicago.  Figure 3 shows the 
estimated rates of change expressed as a percentage of the initial levels of the 
indicators (i.e., slopes divided by intercepts reported in Table 2), which can be 
interpreted as the annual percentage change.   
[Table 2 and Figure 3 about here] 
The first thing that Figure 3 reveals is the comparative volatility of indicators, 
period-to-period.  The completed foreclosures indicator clearly has the most volatile 
trajectory, with the largest relative rates that change direction dramatically from period to 
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period.  In contrast, the crime indicators are the least volatile, having a consistent 
direction and intensity level in each of the three periods.  The other indicators have 
intermediate degrees of volatility: each changes direction at least once across the three 
periods comprising the business cycle and the intensity (i.e., magnitude of the rate of 
change) fluctuates from period to period. 
The second thing that Figure 3 reveals is how different indicators differentially 
track the business cycle.  The foreclosure indicator is pro-cyclical – positive during 
recessionary periods (2000-2002, 2006-2009) and negative during expansionary periods 
(2005-2009), as would be expected.  The same can be said for the employment rate, 
though we only have data for the latter two periods.  By contrast, the mean home loan 
amounts trajectory has a counter-cyclical pattern over the last two periods.  Since the 
level of home lending activity was declining during the 2006 to 2009 period (as indicated 
by the negative trajectory for total amount of home purchase loans; see Table 2), the 
positive trajectory for the mean home purchase loan amount indicator most likely reflects 
the shifting composition of borrowers who were able to secure credit during this period 
(i.e., only those select borrowers with excellent credit ratings and relatively substantial 
assets were able to secure loans, and they bought an atypical selection of more-
expensive homes).  The two crime indicators declined in all periods and thus were not 
cyclical at all.  The last two indicators, small business loans and mean home purchase 
loans, evinced idiosyncratic cyclical patterns. 
The total dollar amount of small loans to businesses, which might be expected to 
have a trajectory more in sync with the economic cycle, had a positive rate of change in 
the first period, changed directions during the mid-decade recovery period, and then 
became more negative (as expected) in the third period.  It is possible that the 2003-
2005 trajectory reflects dynamics related to the mortgage market: rampant housing 
speculation siphoned capital out of business lending pools.  On the other hand, recall 
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that the universe for this measure is loans of one million dollars or less; the negative 
rates of change observed here represent a decrease in the total value of these loans, 
but not necessarily all loans to businesses.  Given what is known about the availability of 
credit during these two periods, discussed earlier, it seems unlikely that the negative rate 
of change for small business loans reflects an overall decline of capital flows to 
businesses, particularly for the middle period (2003-2005).  While a negative rate is 
more probable for the third period, particularly given the unprecedented tightening of all 
credit markets after the collapse of the housing market, it is possible that the negative 
rate seen here overstates the intensity of the trajectory.8 
Finally, consider the distinctive differences in direction and intensity of change for 
the total home purchase amount indicator across the periods.  This indicator showed 
surprising growth during the first recessionary period (2000-2002), but not the second 
(2006-2009).  The increase of the growth rate during the first half of the decade indicates 
loosening of credit markets and economic expansion.  For this particular expansion 
period, it also reflects the formation of the housing bubble; the rapid rate of decline seen 
in the third period reflects the situation after the bubble collapsed.   
 
RESULTS: IMPACTS OF THE GREAT RECESSION ON  
DIFFERENT CHICAGO NEIGHBORHOOD GROUPS  
 
Comparing the indicator trajectories across neighborhood groups suggests that 
the effects of the Great Recession indeed varied substantially across Chicago; see 
Table 3A-E.  To aid in drawing lessons from the cross-neighborhood patterns these 
tables reveal, we have extracted the slope coefficients (trajectories) estimated for the 
Great Recession period and summarized them in Table 4.  Following each trajectory 
estimate we provide a parenthetical term indicating whether it represented the worst (1) 
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or least (5) impact across the five neighborhood groups for the given indicator.  We also 
highlight in bold all trajectories that were inferior to (i.e., less advantageous than) the 
overall city trajectory.   
[Table 4 about here] 
Several indicators reflect the expected disparate impact patterns.  Despite the 
recession, employment rates in the white, moderate income (Group II) and high income 
(Group V) neighborhoods continued to grow (0.4% and 0.3% annually, respectively), 
whereas they declined the in minority, moderate income neighborhoods (Groups I and 
III) and low income neighborhoods (Group IV).  Similarly, mean home purchase loan 
amounts demonstrated the most inferior performance in these same three groups.  The 
worst two upsurges in completed foreclosure rates occurred in moderate income, 
Hispanic (Group III) and low income (Group IV) neighborhoods.  Foreclosure rates 
spiked the least (only 4.7%) in upper income neighborhoods (Group V).  The foregoing 
results all are consistent with our expectation (summarized in Figure 1) that less 
economically advantaged neighborhoods and/or those with larger shares of racial/ethnic 
minorities suffer disproportionally during an economic downturn in terms of local job 
opportunities, home prices, and home foreclosures.   
However, the conventional expectation was not met for the credit market 
indicators – total dollars of lending in both the housing and commercial markets. Though 
both indicator trajectories were strongly negative in all neighborhood groups after 2005, 
the decline was more pronounced in higher income and lower income neighborhoods.  
By contrast, moderate income neighborhoods (regardless of their racial-ethnic 
composition) experienced less-pronounced declines in mortgage lending.  In the case of 
small business lending, the moderate income, white neighborhoods (Group II) suffered 
the second-steepest trajectory of decline (75.6%).   
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In the case of crime there also were no patterns of disparate impacts.  This is not 
surprising because, as noted above, crime was not cyclical during this period; it 
continued its distinct downward trend in macroeconomic good times and bad alike.9  
Thus, there was no recessionary impact to be differentially distributed across space.  
Our multilevel growth model estimated that the lowest-income neighborhood group (IV) 
showed the largest annual post-2005 rates of decline in both property and violent crimes 
and the moderate-income, predominantly white-occupied neighborhoods (Group II) 
evinced the only positive growth rate for property crimes (3.2%) and the smallest rate of 
decline in violent crime (-1.9%) during the Great Recession.  We suspect that this 
trajectory variation had nothing to do with macroeconomic forces but instead was an 
artifact of an equilibrium process whereby temporary factors may inflate or deflate crime 
levels for short periods but levels eventually return to some steady state.10  This is 
consistent with the findings of a supplementary analysis11 in which we found strong 
negative correlations between the starting level of crime and the subsequent change in 
crime (-.48 for property crime and -.81 for violent crime for the 2006-2009 period for 
Chicago overall).  In particular, it is perhaps not surprising that crime declined so rapidly 
in low-income Group IV because it began with the highest level of violent crime and 
second-highest level of property crime (see intercepts reported in Table 3).  
Analogously, moderate-income, white Group II evinced the lowest starting levels of 
property and violent crime, so they might be expected to decline at a smaller rate there. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Comparing the 2000-2002 and 2006-2009 trajectories indicates a critical 
difference between how the two recessions of the 2000s manifested themselves in 
Chicago overall.  In the recession at the start of the decade, the housing market was 
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affected by the weak overall economic conditions, but nevertheless showed a positive 
rate of change in mortgage flows, as was typical for most previous recessions in the 
United States.  In contrast, the latter recession originated in a collapsed housing market 
in which consumer spending once bolstered by debt based on illusory home capital 
gains evaporated, and mortgage credit significantly contracted subsequently. 
 These two differences in the nature of the last two recessions yielded some 
interesting differences in disparate impact patterns; cf. Tables 4 and 5.  Table 5 presents 
information in a comparable format as Table 4, except for the 2000-2002 recession.  
What is apparent is that the expected patterns are more broadly observed in the earlier 
recession (employment rates cannot be compared due to lack of 2000-2002 data).  The 
aforementioned patterns of disparate impact for mean home purchase loans and 
foreclosures are replicated for the earlier recession, though the magnitudes of the 
foreclosure trajectory differences are starker in the former period.  Low income 
neighborhoods (Group IV) evinced a whopping 248.9% increase, followed in order by 
moderate income black (Group I) and Hispanic (Group III) neighborhoods. 
Even more dramatically, the patterns for credit flows (home purchase and small 
business loan dollars) are reversed between the two recessions.  During the 2000-2002 
recession our estimated trajectories strongly showed the expected pattern of disparate 
impacts, with moderate income black (Group I) and Hispanic (Group III) neighborhoods 
having the worst and second-worst impacts. 
What these comparative findings imply is that the Great Recession was unusual 
not only in its severity but in its consequences for credit flows across urban space.  In an 
earlier recession that was not led by the bursting of an easy-credit-fueled housing bubble 
(and subsequent tightening of credit), all economic and housing indicators analyzed 
followed trajectories in ways we would have predicted on the basis of our conceptual 
model summarized in Figure 1.  By contrast, the over-reaction of extremely tight credit 
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instituted by the nearly collapsed financial sector during the Great Recession appears to 
have been applied more even-handed geographically, perhaps even punishing white, 
upper income Chicago neighborhoods proportionately more.  Of course, where 
mortgage loans have continued to trickle is to buyers in these same advantaged 
neighborhoods, as evinced by the relatively robust continued growth in mean mortgage 
values (our proxy for home values) there. 
 [Table 5 about here] 
The final item worth further discussion is our result pertaining to home 
foreclosures, which demonstrated strong patterns of disparate impact during both 
Chicago recessions analyzed.  Not only were the overall levels of foreclosure rates 
higher in Chicago’s lower-income, minority-occupied neighborhoods, but the growth of 
the problem during the downturns was also higher in such places.  This implies that, 
should the wave of foreclosures continue in the future as expected (Saulney 2012), the 
inter-neighborhood gaps in the intensity of this problem will grow.  It also implies that 
more less-advantaged neighborhoods will exceed the thresholds at which foreclosures 
start to create more crime nearby (Ellen, Lacoe, and Sharygin 2011).  This lends further 
testimony to the mounting evidence concenring the unfairly distributed toll imposed by 
the United States’ latest dalliance with weakly regulated financial markets (Immergluck 
and Smith 2006a, b; Kingsley, Price and Smith 2009; Harding, Rosenblatt and Yao 
2009; Cui 2010; Goodstein and Lee 2010; Katz, Wallace and Hedburg 2011). 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
 In this paper we have tried to strengthen and expand the scant literature on how 
macro-scale economic forces play out differentially across small-scale geographies.  We 
have for the first time developed a holistic conceptual framework and employed 
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multilevel change modeling of an unprecedented variety of neighborhood indicators for 
the purposes of this investigation.  Specifically, we have investigated how the business 
cycle swings of the last decade were manifested across Chicago neighborhoods in 
terms of indicator trajectories related to three key domains of quality of life: crime, 
housing, and economy.   
Our first conclusion is that, consistent with Hackworth (2001) and Ong et al. 
(2003), various neighborhood indicators moved along distinct trajectories, not 
necessarily tracking each other or the overall business cycle, and they changed with 
varied intensities.  Most of the trajectory variation was due to differences in the intensity 
of the rates of change rather than their direction.  Neighborhood context, as captured by 
the five groups delineated by our cluster analysis, was strongly associated with trajectory 
variation.  Among the indicators examined, foreclosures were the most volatile and pro-
cyclical, responding strongly and in concert to macro-level forces but mediated at the 
neighborhood level.  Crime was the least volatile, non-cyclical indicator, with a 
somewhat constant negative trajectory across variation in economic conditions.  Mean 
home purchase loan amount operated as a moderately volatile, countercyclical indicator. 
 Our second conclusion is that, consistent with our conceptual framework, the 
Great Recession of 2006-2009 had disparate negative impacts on lower-income and 
minority-occupied neighborhoods as measured by several housing and economic 
indicators.  This conclusion again comports well with those forwarded by Hackworth 
(2001) regarding New York City and Ong et al. (2003) regarding Los Angeles a decade 
earlier.  Comparative trajectories of mean home purchase loans (our proxy for home 
values), completed foreclosures and employment all evinced the anticipated patterns of 
disparate impacts.  Total credit flows (total home purchase and small business loans) 
and crime rates did not, though we suspect the latter is an anomalous result associated 
with the idiosyncratic dynamics of crime.  Our probe of the exceptional results of credit 
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flows revealed a different pattern than was demonstrated during the prior recession of 
2000-2002, which we attributed to the fundamental differences in the origins of these two 
recessions. 
Of course, our study addressed the dynamics of one city, and certainly the 
paradigmatic nature of Chicago as a “city of neighborhoods” suggests that it is not 
necessarily representative (Sampson, 2011).  We thus would urge replication of our 
multilevel change modeling approach in different urban geographies.  If, indeed, the 
conclusion of disparate impacts of business cycles on disadvantaged neighborhoods 
can be generalized, it holds broad implications for urban social problems, politics and 
policy makers.  As the nation’s macroeconomic woes ensue they will disproportionately 
penalize our cities’ most vulnerable neighborhoods, pushing more of them over the 
threshold of spiraling downward decay and social disorder (Galster, Querica and Cortes, 
2000; Galster, 2002; Galster, Cutsinger and Malega, 2008).  Whether these 
communities, their residents, and the cities of which they are a part can recover from 
these blows should be of major concern and sustained attention. 
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Table 1 
Chicago Neighborhood Indicators Analyzed:  
Citywide Averages and Standard Deviations, 2002-2009 
 
Indicator Mean Std. Dev. 
Property crime reports per 10,000 persons 476.24 44.36 
Violent crime reports per 10,000 persons 141.36 15.79 
Home purchase loan amounts ($ in thousands) per owner-occupied, single-family 
housing units 
29.83 9.69 
Mean Home purchase loan amounts ($ in thousands) per loan origination 215.53 32.41 
Completed foreclosures per 10,000 owner-occupied, single-family housing units 154.63 51.53 
Business loan amounts ($ in thousands) per square mile of commercial land area 33289.38 5217.38 
Resident workers per 10,000 working-age persons 4234.34 375.42 
 
SOURCE: Authors’ analysis of data assembled by Metro Chicago Information Center. 
 
  
 
Table 2 
Estimated Neighborhood Indicator Trajectories, Chicago Overall, by Period 
 
  2000 to 2002  2003 to 2005  2006 to 2009 
  Intercept Slope  Intercept Slope  Intercept Slope 
Property crime rate 1 610.8 *** -34.3 *** 545.0 *** -26.2 *** 498.7 *** -13.6 *** 
 2 (57.0)  (7.6)  (42.9)  (4.0)  (39.9)  (4.4)  
Violent crime rate 1 190.2 *** -6.5 *** 161.8 *** -4.3 *** 157.6 *** -9.4 *** 
 2 (17.7)  (2.2)  (14.0)  (1.3)  (14.1)  (1.7)  
Completed foreclosures 1 227.5 *** 86.6 *** 401.4 *** -99.8 *** 105.1 *** 25.3 *** 
 2 (39.4)  (18.3)  (65.8)  (17.8)  (13.8)  (4.3)  
Total home purchase loan $ 1 40.1 *** 6.0 *** 60.4 *** 15.7 *** 89.3 *** -19.9 *** 
 2 (9.3)  (1.4)  (12.2)  (4.3)  (16.5)  (3.3)  
Mean home purchase loan $ 1 139.4 *** 12.6 *** 182.0 *** -2.6 *** 189.0 *** 8.5 *** 
 2 (5.3)  (0.9)  (6.6)  (0.7)  (5.9)  (2.0)  
Total small business loan $  1 322.1 *** 25.3 *** 451.5 *** -21.8 *** 457.3 *** -58.9 *** 
 2 (85.6)  (5.9)  (86.4)  (6.8)  (85.8)  (12.0)  
Employed resident rate 1 NA  NA  42.9 *** -0.2  40.8 *** -0.0  
 2     (0.8)  (0.2)  (1.0)  (0.5)  
NOTES: Indicator trajectories were estimated using multilevel change models. Parameters shown above are the fixed effects. 
Statistical significance levels: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent.  
 
  
 
Table 3A 
Estimated Neighborhood Indicator Trajectories, Group I, by Period 
 
  2000 to 2002  2003 to 2005  2006 to 2009 
  Intercept Slope  Intercept Slope  Intercept Slope 
Property crime rate 1 620.2 *** -20.3  603.9 *** -24.5 ** 580.6 *** -12.1  
 2 (50.2)  (13.0)  (40.7)  (9.1)  (30.4)  (7.6)  
Violent crime rate 1 236.2 *** 3.2  230.0 *** -1.8  244.7 *** -9.5 ** 
 2 (16.7)  (4.3)  (17.1)  (3.3)  (17.0)  (4.0)  
Completed foreclosures 1 215.3 *** 77.3 *** 445.7 *** -101 *** 173.2 *** 8.3  
 2 (25.9)  (12.7)  (47.3)  (16.7)  (24.2)  (17.7)  
Total home purchase loan $ 1 4.5 *** 0.2  6.1 *** 2.4 *** 10.9 *** -3.2 *** 
 2 (0.4)  (0.3)  (0.6)  (0.4)  (1.5)  (0.5)  
Mean home purchase loan $ 1 95.7 *** 2.6  115.0 *** -2.2 * 131.9 *** 8.4  
 2 (5.0)  (2.2)  (4.7)  (1.1)  (9.7)  (8.6)  
Total small business loan $  1 106.1 *** 7.0  138.6 *** -4.7  158.6 *** -29.2 *** 
 2 (18.4)  (5.4)  (26.9)  (10.1)  (26.0)  (7.2)  
Employed resident rate 1 NA  NA  38.0 *** -0.8  35.7 *** -0.2  
 2     (0.7)  (0.6)  (1.2)  (1.1)  
 
(continued) 
 
  
Table 3B  
Estimated Neighborhood Indicator Trajectories, Group II, by Period  
 
  2000 to 2002  2003 to 2005  2006 to 2009 
  Intercept Slope  Intercept Slope  Intercept Slope 
Property crime rate 1 335.9 *** -13.2 *** 300.2 *** -11.7 ** 263.1 *** 3.2  
 2 (22.2)  (3.4)  (21.0)  (4.7)  (17.9)  (6.1)  
Violent crime rate 1 64.3 *** -4.0 ** 54.7 *** -2.7 ** 49.5 *** -1.9 *** 
 2 (8.9)  (1.6)  (6.7)  (1.1)  (6.2)  (0.6)  
Completed foreclosures 1 65.3 ** 4.4  73.7 *** -18.5 *** 22.3 *** 19.1 *** 
 2 (28.6)  (12.2)  (12.7)  (4.3)  (5.1)  (3.0)  
Total home purchase loan $ 1 28.8 *** 4.8 ** 43.3 *** 8.3 *** 49.6 *** -10.2 *** 
 2 (7.6)  (2.2)  (12.1)  (2.1)  (12.8)  (2.3)  
Mean home purchase loan $ 1 155.1 *** 15.5 *** 205.2 *** -3.8 *** 198.3 *** 9.3 *** 
 2 (6.7)  (1.3)  (8.5)  (1.3)  (8.2)  (2.1)  
Total small business loan $  1 346.9 *** 42.6 ** 553.2 *** -42.7 *** 546.5 *** -75.6 *** 
 2 (49.8)  (15.9)  (69.7)  (14.3)  (72.0)  (13.1)  
Employed resident rate 1 NA  NA  48.1 *** -0.0  44.4 *** 0.4  
 2     (1.0)  (0.3)  (1.8)  (1.6)  
 
(continued) 
 
  
Table 3C 
Estimated Neighborhood Indicator Trajectories, Group III, by Period 
 
 
  2000 to 2002  2003 to 2005  2006 to 2009 
  Intercept Slope  Intercept Slope  Intercept Slope 
Property crime rate 1 462.6 *** -16.5 ** 429.8 *** -33.9 *** 362.1 *** -8.7 ** 
 2 (29.2)  (7.5)  (30.6)  (5.5)  (24.5)  (3.3)  
Violent crime rate 1 117.9 *** -0.4  104.1 *** -4.6 * 97.3 *** -3.9 *** 
 2 (14.8)  (2.2)  (12.6)  (2.6)  (11.9)  (1.4)  
Completed foreclosures 1 117.5 ** 40.3 * 218.8 ** -62.4 ** 52.1 *** 49.9 *** 
 2 (45.6)  (22.6)  (76.4)  (26.1)  (17.3)  (5.7)  
Total home purchase loan $ 1 14.4 *** 2.2 *** 23.4 *** 6.1 *** 29.1 *** -8.3 *** 
 2 (1.6)  (0.5)  (2.9)  (1.7)  (4.8)  (1.4)  
Mean home purchase loan $ 1 128.2 *** 15.5 *** 179.7 *** -4.2 ** 187.1 *** -1.6  
 2 (6.4)  (1.8)  (9.0)  (1.7)  (7.9)  (4.6)  
Total small business loan $  1 135.5 *** 14.8  231.7 *** -5.8  186.8 *** -21.8 *** 
 2 (18.6)  (9.0)  (24.2)  (6.9)  (21.0)  (4.7)  
Employed resident rate 1 NA  NA  41.7 *** -1.1 *** 37.8 *** -0.6  
 2     (2.0)  (0.2)  (1.8)  (0.7)  
 
(continued) 
 
  
Table 3D  
Estimated Neighborhood Indicator Trajectories, Group IV, by Period  
 
  2000 to 2002  2003 to 2005  2006 to 2009 
  Intercept Slope  Intercept Slope  Intercept Slope 
Property crime rate 1 731.2 *** -42.2 *** 658.6 *** -24.6 ** 625.3 *** -32.1 *** 
 2 (66.4)  (12.6)  (52.5)  (10.4)  (49.4)  (6.9)  
Violent crime rate 1 374.9 *** -18.8 *** 302.6 *** -7.1  290.4 *** -22.0 *** 
 2 (39.3)  (6.8)  (28.5)  (4.3)  (29.3)  (4.8)  
Completed foreclosures 1 584.8 *** 248.9 *** 1028 *** -254 *** 234.9 *** 33.7 * 
 2 (117.6)  (56.3)  (191.7)  (54.4)  (34.8)  (18.9)  
Total home purchase loan $ 1 23.2 *** 7.5 *** 46.7 *** 20.6 *** 116.9 *** -35.2 *** 
 2 (3.5)  (2.3)  (8.5)  (5.7)  (27.4)  (9.1)  
Mean home purchase loan $ 1 120.8 *** 11.9 *** 158.8 *** -2.5  180.3 *** 8.9  
 2 (8.9)  (2.3)  (9.4)  (1.7)  (11.4)  (7.2)  
Total small business loan $  1 120.3 *** 21.5  216.6 *** 5.1  248.5 *** -34.3 ** 
 2 (19.7)  (19.2)  (41.1)  (9.0)  (42.2)  (14.6)  
Employed resident rate 1 NA  NA  36.8 *** -0.1  36.2 *** -0.0  
 2     (0.8)  (0.3)  (1.1)  (0.6)  
 
(continued) 
 
  
Table 3E ) 
Estimated Neighborhood Indicator Trajectories, Group V, by Period  
  2000 to 2002  2003 to 2005  2006 to 2009 
  Intercept Slope  Intercept Slope  Intercept Slope 
Property crime rate 1 1398 ** -134 ** 1116 *** -62.3 *** 1012 *** -28.9  
 2 (435.2)  (53.4)  (308.4)  (16.2)  (285.5)  (32.2)  
Violent crime rate 1 166.6 *** -10.8  128.6 *** -5.4  121.6 *** -10.3 * 
 2 (40.1)  (7.7)  (25.5)  (3.2)  (28.5)  (5.2)  
Completed foreclosures 1 47.1 ** 29.5 *** 87.7 *** -24.9  17.3 * 4.7  
 2 (15.9)  (8.0)  (23.3)  (15.2)  (7.6)  (5.5)  
Total home purchase loan $ 1 222.5 *** 22.6 * 304.0 *** 65.7 * 379.5 *** -59.3 *** 
 2 (60.7)  (12.5)  (72.2)  (37.2)  (94.1)  (17.1)  
Mean home purchase loan $ 1 230.9 *** 16.6 *** 284.0 *** 2.7  279.0 *** 24.0 ** 
 2 (11.6)  (3.2)  (15.9)  (3.5)  (19.1)  (11.0)  
Total small business loan $  1 1453 * 32.1  1654 * -84.3 * 1705 ** -188 ** 
 2 (763.1)  (35.9)  (716.8)  (40.1)  (693.8)  (88.7)  
Employed resident rate 1 NA  NA  52.5 *** 1.9 ** 55.8 *** 0.3  
 2     (1.4)  (0.8)  (4.2)  (3.3)  
NOTES: Indicator trajectories were estimated using multilevel change models. Parameters shown above are the fixed effects. 
Statistical significance levels: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. 
 
  
 
 
Table 4 
Comparative Neighborhood Indicator Trajectories across Groups, Chicago 2006-2009 
[bold = inferior to Overall; rank shown parenthetically, with 1=most inferior performance, 5=least] 
 
 Overall I II III IV V 
Property crime rate 1 -13.6  -12.1 (3) 3.2 (1) -8.7 (2) -32.1 (5) -28.9 (4) 
Violent crime rate 1 -9.4  -9.5 (3) -1.9 (1) -3.9 (2) -22.0 (5) -10.3 (4) 
Completed foreclosures 1 25.3  8.3 (4) 19.1 (3) 49.9 (1) 33.7 (2) 4.7 (5) 
Total home purchase loan $ 1 -19.9  -3.2 (5) -10.2 (3) -8.3 (4) -35.2 (2) -59.3 (1) 
Mean home purchase loan $ 1 8.5  8.4 (2) 9.3 (4) -1.6 (1) 8.9 (3) 24.0 (5) 
Total small business loan $  1 -58.9  -29.2 (4) -75.6 (2) -21.8 (5) -34.3 (3) -188 (1) 
Employed resident rate 1 -0.0  -0.2 (2) 0.4 (5) -0.6 (1) -0.0 (3) 0.3 (4) 
 
NOTES: Indicator trajectories were estimated using multilevel change models, as reported in Tables 2, 3A-E.  
 
  
 
 
Table 5 
Comparative Neighborhood Indicator Trajectories across Chicago Neighborhood Groups, 2000-2002 
[bold = inferior to Overall; rank shown parenthetically, with 1=most inferior performance, 5=least] 
 
 Overall I II III IV V 
Property crime rate 1 -34.3  -20.3 (3) -13.2 (1) -16.5 (2) -42.2 (4) -134 (5) 
Violent crime rate 1 -6.5  3.2 (1) -4.0 (3) -0.4 (2) -18.8 (5) -10.8 (4) 
Completed foreclosures 1 86.6  77.3 (2) 4.4 (5) 40.3 (3) 248.9 (1) 29.5 (4) 
Total home purchase loan $ 1 6.0  0.2 (1) 4.8 (3) 2.2 (2) 7.5 (4) 22.6 (5) 
Mean home purchase loan $ 1 12.6  2.6 (1) 15.5 (3) 15.5 (3) 11.9 (2) 16.6 (5) 
Total small business loan $  1 25.3  7.0 (1) 42.6 (5) 14.8 (2) 21.5 (3) 32.1 (4) 
 
NOTES: Indicator trajectories were estimated using multilevel change models, as reported in Tables 2, 3A-E; 
employed resident rates are omitted since data unavailable for this period.  
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 1 
Conceptual Framework for Disparate Impacts of Macroeconomic Forces 
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Figure 2 
Community Areas and Five Neighborhood Clusters in Chicago 
 
  
 
Figure 3 
Chicago Neighborhood Indicator Trajectories*, by Period 
 
 
SOURCE: Authors’ analysis of data assembled by Metro Chicago Information Center. 
* annual average rate of change based on information in Table 2; information on employed residents omitted since not 
available all periods 
 
  
Appendix Table 1 
 
Mean Characteristics of Chicago Neighborhoods, by Group,  
 
Characteristic used in Cluster Analysis 
[year 2000 unless noted otherwise] 
                Neighborhood Group 
All   I  II  III  IV  V 
Population and households         
Population change, 1990-2000 (%)  3.6  -5.0 5.6 20.4 -9.7 13.7 
Population age 55+ change, 1990-2000 
(%) 
 
-6.8 
 
11.2 -10.5 -13.3 -12.5 1.2 
Black (%)  42.7  90.9 10.7 8.8 84.2 20.4 
Hispanic (%)  21.0  5.3 21.0 61.4 4.4 12.2 
Foreign-born (%)  18.6  3.6 26.9 37.0 6.5 13.8 
Less than high school education (%)  29.3  25.3 22.0 45.7 34.6 13.5 
Unemployed civilian labor force (%)  6.8  8.4 3.8 5.8 10.9 4.7 
Living in poverty (%)  20.9  19.9 10.6 17.4 38.1 16.7 
Household poverty (%)  19.6  18.6 10.1 16.7 36.0 14.4 
Households receiving public assistance 
(%) 
 
8.5 
 
11.0 3.2 5.9 17.1 3.8 
Households with earnings (%)  77.1  76.6 80.7 80.9 67.1 84.8 
Mean annual household income ($)  
49,646 
 45,90
8 57,022 45,826 34,491 78,646 
Households with single mothers (%)  11.6  15.2 5.0 9.0 21.7 4.8 
Moved in last five years (%)  57.1  68.7 57.7 56.0 57.0 38.8 
Housing units (%)         
Rentals  47.6  36.8 39.1 44.6 63.5 56.6 
Vacant  8.7  7.5 4.2 7.0 15.6 10.0 
Multi 2 to 4  31.4  25.8 22.9 51.0 33.9 22.7 
Multi 5 or more  32.9  15.9 30.4 11.9 49.8 65.0 
Built in last 5 years  2.6  0.9 1.7 2.0 3.0 8.4 
Housing market         
Single-family home purchase loans (N)  2,313  476 1,830 1,127 1,713 10,471 
Change in number of loans, 1995-2000 
(%) 
 
74.6 
 
27.9 43.7 9.2 138.2 207.0 
Single-family home loan mean amount 
($) 
 
140 
 
97 155 128 119 232 
Change in mean loan amount, 1995-
2000 (%) 
 
36.0 
 
33.5 36.3 34.5 36.8 40.4 
Filed foreclosures (N)  310  265 89 177 763 161 
  
Characteristic used in Cluster Analysis 
[year 2000 unless noted otherwise] 
                Neighborhood Group 
All   I  II  III  IV  V 
Change in filed foreclosures, 1998-2000 
(%) 
 
36.0 
 
25.5 10.2 35.8 59.0 73.8 
Completed foreclosures (N)  226  222 69 126 563 49 
Change in number of completed 
foreclosures (%) 
 
51.5 
 
67.9 23.5 54.6 92.0 -0.6 
 
SOURCE: MDRC analysis of data assembled by Metro Chicago Information Center 
(MCIC). 
 
NOTES: Shown above is the mean (average) across neighborhoods for the indicated 
characteristics. Unless otherwise indicated, the reference period for measurement is 2000. 
The percentage of individuals and households living in poverty is defined using income 
thresholds set by the Office of Management and Budget that vary by family size. 
 
  
 
Endnotes 
                                                
1 The Census tract designations used for these transformations are the definitions created after 
the 2000 decennial Census;  data collected or assembled using earlier designations was 
transformed to the 2000-era designations using the relational matrices published by the US 
Census Bureau. For most of the neighborhoods, the definitional boundaries align with tract 
boundaries such that the neighborhood-level measure is the aggregation of the tract-level 
measure.  In cases where this is not true, the tract values were apportioned between multiple 
neighborhoods based on the distribution of the tract’s population between the multiple 
neighborhoods. 
2 With multiple incidents the report is classified in the UCR category of the most serious crime 
(generally, the crime with the highest potential penalty).  Note that these are police reports and 
do not reflect later adjudication of the incident (e.g., an assault recorded on the initial report as a 
criminal act later adjudicated as justifiable self-defense is still included). 
3 HMDA data are used instead of sales price data due to the relatively longer time series 
available; HMDA data was available starting in 1992 while the sales price data was only 
available as two, incongruent time series that covered a more limited period.  The HMDA and 
sales price data exhibited the same trends for the times in which we had overlapping coverage.  
Galster, Hayes, and Johnson (2005) demonstrated the value of HMDA data as a source for 
constructing neighborhood indicators. 
4 Both filed and completions data exclude ownership transfers that occur as the result of 
financial distress (short sales or deed-in-lieu-of-foreclosure transactions). 
5 Details of the cluster analysis procedures, indicator variables employed, and allocations of 
particular neighborhood to cluster groups are available from the authors. 
  
                                                                                                                                                       
6 This is a more refined way of dealing with "abnormal" spikes/troughs in longitudinal 
trajectories, which examination of our data indicate are focused on specific neighborhoods 
rather than across the entire sample. 
7 The multilevel model random effects are different from the random effects commonly used in 
econometric time series models.  In the multilevel formulation, the random effects are equivalent 
to main effects, with the descriptor “random” referring to the nature of the neighborhoods (i.e., 
they are theoretically drawn at random from some larger population).  In contrast, the 
econometric random effects describes the effect of individual differences (i.e., random 
disturbance), which is necessary to account for to generate unbiased estimates for the main 
effects.  
8 The trend and trajectory seen for Chicago and its neighborhoods is consistent with data 
reported by the FFIEC regarding national trends in these loans.  An additional explanation for 
the results reported here is the cut-off point for reporting; that is, due to inflation and other 
trends in business capitalization, one million dollars may no longer reflect the high point for the 
types of loans the data collection program was intended was track. 
9 There are several potential explanations for this long-term decline, including reductions in the 
pool of teenagers, stabilization of local drug markets, mandatory prison sentencing 
requirements, and new policing strategies. 
 
10 This was the conclusion of Galster, Cutsinger, and Lim (2007) and Lim and Galster (2008) in 
their analyses of neighborhood crime dynamics.  Note that this argument cannot be made in the 
aforementioned case of foreclosures because in general there was a positive correlation 
between starting levels and rates of change: .80 for Chicago overall. 
11 Correlations are available upon request. 
